Central and Inner Asia Seminar
University of Toronto

Profile
Central and Inner Asia Studies (CIAS) at the University of Toronto grew out of the Canada-Mongolia Association which was founded in 1987 for the study of the cultures and activities of ancient and modern nomadic peoples. Since 1990, the reach of CIAS activities has expanded to include the sedentary cultures of Central Asia and the lands bordering the Silk Road.

Although the term Central and Inner Asia is used to represent the enormous territory surrounded by Russia, China, the Indian subcontinent, Iran, the Caucasus Mountains and the Caspian Sea, the region had little visibility in the West until 1990 because it was divided between the spheres of Soviet and Chinese control and influence. Since 1990 the region has become a centre of evolving democracies and growing economies. New political structures are being developed and new economic potentials are being explored. The world’s powers are bringing their economic and strategic interests to the region.

Central and Inner Asia share the social, religious and cultural aspects of the surrounding countries and are the territory which for millennia have linked them together. The rich historical and cultural background determines current trends of development and both reaffirms national identities and helps the region to adjust to changes in local and international currents. Simultaneously, the process of reaffirmation of national identities provides the point of departure for forming new identities.

Regions within the purview of the CIAS: Afghanistan, Inner Mongolia, Iran, Kalmykia, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Tibet, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, East Turkistan (Xinjiang).
THE EXPLOITATION OF THE LANDSCAPE OF CENTRAL AND INNER ASIA: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

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FOREWORD

The land and waters above the Central Asian bedrock have long been inhabited by living things, while below lie the natural resources which humankind has exploited for its development and to its detriment. In a world divided into nations, there is little of the landscape that is not now claimed by one of them. With colonization comes human history and, with that, every aspect of human society, including law, government, religion, and custom. Colonization presupposes the conquest of natural phenomena or of indigenous populations, and conquest demands security by the conqueror over what has been conquered. Ancient custom, arising from early colonization, places burdens on those who control the landscape. In human terms, Central and Inner Asia represents ancient landscapes controlled by the triple forces of custom, conquest and colonization. Peoples vie to possess that control, yet are controlled by what they possess. At every turn, they exploit their own landscape insofar as custom, politics and the economy permit. The resultant diversity renders some regions far sounder than others, while at the same time common social bonds are expressed through lifestyle in general, and local custom in particular. Contemporary approaches to “modernization” are applying enormous pressures to the landscape and its resources, and sometimes placing heavy burdens on the inhabitants. In the long term, however, it is the landscape that determines the success or failure of human endeavour in the region. The papers collected in this volume discuss the ever-changing relationship between the physical territory and the condition of those who derive their existence from it.

Toronto, March, 2008
“ON EITHER SIDE THE RIVER”: THE RISE OF THE MANCHU STATE AND CHOSÔN’S JURCHEN SUBJECTS

Adam Bohnet

INTRODUCTION

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the northern corner of Chosŏn, modern North Hamgyŏng Province, was dominated by Jurchen tribesmen who were simultaneously subjects of the Chosŏn monarchy, and tied, through clan affiliation, trade, and kinship, to Jurchen groups outside of Chosŏn authority. During the early seventeenth century, the Manchu rulers Nurhaci (1559–1626) and Hong Taiji (1592–1643, r. 1626–1643), claimed the loyalty of these Jurchen, on the basis of prior genealogical links to the Jurchen Jin Dynasty (1115–1234). Then, through military and diplomatic means, they set about removing these Jurchen from territory under Chosŏn control. In this the Manchu rulers were successful, and by the 1640s most, though not all, of the once considerable population of Jurchen groups south of the Tumen River had been removed, to be integrated into the new Manchu state as soldiers, bond-servants (boot) or as peasants. Large areas of Manchuria north of the Tumen River and also of the northern reaches of Chosŏn Korea were emptied of population, such that, in 1712, the courts of Chosŏn Korea and the Manchu Qing were able to clarify the borders between their respective jurisdictions without concerning themselves with any legal population in these regions.3

While the border delimitation of 1712 has recently attracted a fair amount of scholarly interest, the earlier process that made such delimitation possible—

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1 Of course, the term “Manchu” was not used before Nurhaci, and did not come into official use until 1635 during the reign of Hong Taiji, when the term “Jurchen” (Man-jusen) was also proscribed. The term is of uncertain meaning or derivation. See Giovanni Stary, “The Meaning of the Word ‘Manchu’.” That being said, I will occasionally use the term Manchu anachronistically in order to distinguish Jurchen within the state ruled by Nurhaci and Hong Taiji from those outside their rule, and to refer collectively to the dynasties founded by Nurhaci and Hong Taiji, the Later Jin (1616–1636) and Qing (1636–1912) as well as to the domain under Nurhaci’s control before 1616.

2 If the term “Manchuria” is somewhat anachronistic before 1635, the term “Manchuria” is even more so. As Mark Elliott reminds us in the “Limits of Tartary,” no form of the word “Manchuria” was used in European languages until 1830, while the use of variations of “Manchu” in Chinese to denote a location began even later. Because there is no good alternative, I will occasionally use the term anachronistically.

3 Of course, illegal populations, mostly temporary ginseng diggers who did, in fact, establish themselves in these regions were a major spur to the delimitation of the border. See Seonmin Kim, “Ginseng and Border Trespassing.”

4 Three recent treatments in English are Andre Schmid, Korea between Empires, 199–252, Marion Eggert, “A Borderline Case,” and Seonmin Kim “Ginseng and Border Trespassing.” All
the forcible removal of Chosŏn's border-crossing Jurchen subjects in the Tumen valley—has attracted very little. Such lack of interest was not shown by seventeen century officials in either Chosŏn Korea or the incipient Manchu state, both of whom treated control over Chosŏn's Jurchen subjects as a matter of first importance. For the Chosŏn court, used to controlling its northern frontier with a community of Jurchen whose loyalties were deliberately allowed to remain ambiguous, the demand by Nurhaci and Hong Taiji for the total loyalty of these subjects was not only presumptuous, it was a direct challenge to Chosŏn's control of its northern border. For the Jurchen subjects themselves, accustomed to relative autonomy on the outskirts of Chosŏn administration, the prospect of forced participation in Nurhaci and Hong Taiji's endless wars is unlikely to have been always attractive. Finally, although the Manchu state ultimately was able to impose its definition of loyalty upon Chosŏn's Jurchen subjects, the process by which it imposed this genealogically-based definition of loyalty was itself new, part of the general creation of a new Manchu identity out of the heterogeneous community of Jurchen tribes, over which it sought to assert authority. Ultimately, well before the geographical delimitation could be contemplated, the rising Manchu state effectuated the delimitation of populations, with profound implications for the history of the region.

POROUS FRONTIER: THE PÔNHŌ OF THE SIX GARRISONS

In 1614, Yi Sugwang (1563–1629), a prominent Chosŏn official of the Sŏn faction, expressed great worry about the disappearance of the Jurchen of the Mu Paektu area on the northern fringe of Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910) Korean territory. Remarking that it had been 200 years since Kim Chongsŏ (1390–1453) had established the Six Garrisons (ilchim) in the region, he expressed concern that, with the rise of Nurhaci, "those Jurchen (ho) who live at the foot of the fortifications and are thus called Fence Jurchen (pǒnhō)" had been forced either to join Nurhaci or retreat into the interior of Chosŏn. This, to Yi, had seriously compromised Chosŏn's defences, such that "though someone" settles right on our borders, or even illegally enters deep into our territory, there is nobody who dares even to ask who he is. When the lips are gone the teeth grow cold—this is an unpleasant worry!"

In 1672, Nam Kuman (1629–1711), of the same Sŏn faction as Yi, also discussed the historical presence of Jurchen in the Mt. Paektu region and their subsequent forcible removal by Nurhaci. His response to their expulsion was, however, completely different from that of Yi. He mentioned the unfortunate fact that, following the fall of Koguryŏ (in 668), Jurchen had been able to seize control of the area. He lamented that despite the fact that the Jurchen had left 50 to 60 years earlier "on their own accord," the Chosŏn court, considering the region to be Jurchen territory, did not dare occupy it. Yet, Nam pointed out, the Not'o (Chin: Laotu) tribe of Jurchen which had lived there had caused particular hardship to Chosŏn; Chosŏn should not miss its chance to reconquer it before new groups of barbarians should establish themselves in the region. Why such different opinions concerning the same events? Yi's worry at the disappearance of the Jurchen communities of North Hamgyŏng Province was not, it would seem, inspired by an open-minded departure from Korean-Confucian prejudices against Jurchen, or by any particularly pro-Jurchen point of view. He discussed the pǒnhō in the context of other Pangnu or 'Northern Caitiffs.' Indeed in the passage immediately preceding, he revealed considerable concern at the large community of transforming Jurchen (hwanghwa hoin) in Kyŏnggi Province. These were the very pǒnhō who had fled south rather than face assimilation in Nurhaci's new state. Although they were welcomed on the northern border, there was such density of these Jurchen in Kyŏnggi Province that the fires of different Jurchen villages were visible to each other, and this presaged serious trouble. To Yi, these Jurchen were clearly culturally heterogeneous with other Chosŏn subjects—much as their absence from the northern frontier was to be regretted, their presence in Chosŏn proper was also a serious matter of concern, and understood to be a threat. While Nam was clearly not free from the anti-Qing hostility which characterized many Chosŏn officials during this period, Nam should not be stereotyped as an ignorant, bigoted, central official. In fact, he had considerable official and personal experience in the North Hamgyŏng region. Clearly also, he was fully aware of the events described by Yi. Yet, in contrast to Yi, Nam accepted that cultural or genealogical links gave Nurhaci legitimate authority over Chosŏn's Jurchen subjects, such that Nurhaci's forced removal of the Jurchen could be described as the Jurchen leaving "on their own accord."

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Evidently, between Yi Sugwang in the early seventeenth century and Nam Kuman later in the same century, attitudes towards ethnicity and territory had changed and what had been a positive and necessary presence to Yi became an unpleasant memory to Nam. The late seventeenth century involved the steady growth of interest in the precise measuring of territory, culminating in 1712 in an accurate delimitation of the Chosŏn-Qing frontier.\(^{11}\) The Tumen River, and the region of Mt. Paektu in which the Jurchen referred to by both Nam and Yi had lived, was a key part of this newly-clarified border. However, in the sixteenth century it was a zone of contact in which Jurchen of different sorts interacted with forced settlers from the southern Provinces. Such Jurchen as willingly accommodated themselves to Chosŏn had been a vital aspect of Chosŏn defence since the establishment of military fortifications in the region during the reign of Sejong. During this period local Jurchen were settled in South Hamgyŏng Province, while a mixture of forces including Korean settlers from the south and Jurchen communities from the north were established in the new territories on the south bank of the Tumen River.\(^{12}\) Even after the tumultuous wars by the Ming and Chosŏn armies against the Jurchen during the mid fifteenth century,\(^ {13}\) Jurchen continued to play key roles on the Chosŏn frontier. The Sŏnjo Sujŏng Sillok, in the midst of a description of the 1583 Nitt'angae uprising, defined the pŏnho of North Hamgyŏng Province as Jurchen who lived across the river, and who, if properly controlled, could provide vital information concerning the deep-dwelling Jurchen (simch’ŏn), in which category was included all Jurchen “from north of the mountains” who had not yet submitted personally to the Chosŏn court. The editor of the Sillok saw that a firm hand on the part of the administrators of the region was necessary for the maintenance of proper control over the pŏnho.\(^ {14}\)

The description of the pŏnho living across the river from the defensive structures and the deep-dwelling Jurchen living north of the mountains is in many ways inaccurate; as a brief review of the materials in question will show, many pŏnho were living south of the Tumen, while ‘deep-dwelling Jurchen’ were less defined geographically than by their political distance from the Chosŏn military structure.\(^ {15}\) The frontier which the pŏnho was helping to defend was not a linear, precisely defined border, nor did the territorial Chosŏn and the jurisdictional or administrative Chosŏn fully correspond.\(^ {16}\) The Chosŏn attempted to exert influence both north and south of the Tumen River, and was only one source of power over the Jurchen to the south of the river, whose communities were “sites of Jurchen culture, administration, governance and social customs as they were sites of Korean administrative entry.”\(^ {17}\) Such terms for pŏnho as sŏngjŏ hoine & sŏngjŏ yain, both of which can be translated as “Jurchen who live at the foot of the fortifications,” and kŏsŏngjŏja or “those who live at the foot of the fortifications,”\(^ {18}\) emphasise the proximity—cultural, political as well as spatial—between the pŏnho and the Chosŏn administration.

Very often intermarried with the settler communities,\(^ {19}\) engaging increasingly in agriculture,\(^ {20}\) and certainly tied, through gift-giving, visits to Hana'gang, and military connections, to the Chosŏn state,\(^ {21}\) the pŏnho nevertheless continued to possess extensive contacts, and presumably kin-connections, with other Jurchen, the deep-dwelling Jurchen. It was, of course, these connections to deep-dwelling Jurchen that made them useful to the Chosŏn state, as is shown in numerous passages from the Sillok in which pŏnho either successfully provide information to the Chosŏn military, or fail to provide information to the Chosŏn court and are criticized for their failure in this regard.\(^ {22}\) Their intermediate status also meant that they were ideally suited to play the role of middleman in trade relations between Chosŏn and other Jurchen.\(^ {23}\) In fact, reworking of the Ch'ae'gung pongnyak does not, by contrast, specify the location of villages to the north or south of the river, but the presence of a considerable number of pŏnho villages (pŏnho p'ŏrat) listed to the south of garrisons and defensive structures suggests that many would have been to the south of the river. For instance, on page 52 the N'intal'ye village is described as being 10 li to the south of Yŏn'ŏnjin, while on page 57 the T'an'an'ae village is described as being 9 li to the south of Tong'gwango.\(^ {24}\)

Kenneth Robinson, “Shaping Interaction”, discusses the tension between the jurisdictional and territorial Chosŏn among the Jurchen in Hamgyŏng Province in some detail.


These and similar phrases were seemingly used earlier than pŏnho. There are numerous examples, among which are Toromun-gum 5'gi 08.13a, Yŏn'gang 1 (1495) 08.25 (t'arae), Facsimile 13:29, Sŏnjo Sillok 162:9b Sŏnjo 15 (1584) 01.15 (hoj'ŏng), facsimile 10:560, both of which place with something of a definition of the defensive function and social position of the Jurchen in question. The use of pŏnho village (pŏnho purat) in the Ch'ae'gung pongnyak as a regular category in the description of the defensive structures may suggest that by the late sixteenth century the category pŏnho was becoming more institutionalized and formalized than previously.


Kawachi Yoshitomo, Nihon kijokushita no kengya, 625–656.


For instance, to the Sŏnjo Sillok 167:13, Sŏnjo 36 (1603) 10.26 (esojin), facsimile 24:349, the North Hamgyŏng army commander Yi Yong, while calling for strong measures against the Ula to restore the loyalty of the pŏnho, says that: “the reason why the state protects and supports the pŏnho, is simply this: those who want to submit to the authority must discover for us the movements of the deep-dwellers. That is to say, all we expect from the pŏnho is that they provide us with information.”

Late fifteenth and sixteenth century Jurchen-Chosŏn trade in pelts is discussed by Kawachi, 592–568, who also quotes passages which emphasize the role of “those at the foot of the fortifi-
the pŏnhŏs, as the eyes and ears of the Chosŏn military, were useful only in so far as their loyalties and connections extended to areas and people outside the range of Chosŏn administration. Their submission to the Chosŏn court was not predicated on their locating themselves unambiguously within either the administrative or territorial boundaries of Chosŏn society; in fact it was their marginal status as borderland people, which provided them with access both to the Chosŏn court and to the world of the various Jurchen tribes, which made them valuable.

The same time, as the above passage from the Sŏnjo Sŭjang Sillok suggests, the borderland loyalties of the pŏnhŏ could place the state at risk. Their connections to other Jurchen meant that they could also join with deep-dwelling Jurchen for attacks on settlers and military facilities in North Hamgyŏng Province. The area had been, since the reigns of Sejo and Sejong, populated not only by communities of Jurchen but also by a large numbers of settlers from Kyŏngsang, Ch'ŏlla and Ch'ungch'ŏng Provinces, many of them settled by force. The need to buy the loyalty of the impoverished settlers who were, like the Jurchen, essential for defence meant that, during the reign of Sŏnjo, there was a series of conflicts which developed as settlers encroached on Jurchen land. These encroachments attracted violence on the part of the Jurchen in question, which brought reprisals from the Chosŏn military upon the Jurchen, which in turn resulted in large-scale uprisings from the Jurchen. 24 For instance, in 1583, when a pŏnhŏ, Nit'anggae, was able to stage a large uprising with support from not only the Iljuhan Wutt'o but also numerous other pŏnhŏs, including especially the Yulp'ori of Ch'untron-bo in Chongsŏng; this unrest continued until the 1587 troubles around Noktun Island, where another group of settlers had displaced a pre-existing community of Jurchen. 25 With the 1592 invasion of the region by the Japanese under Katō Kiyamasa, the local people rose up

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to assist his conquest, allowing, in the process "sundry Jurchen from across the river," 26 to make raids across the river. As the Chosŏn administration collapsed in the face of Japanese troops and rebellious peasantry, a mixture of pŏnhŏ and deep-dwelling Jurchen attacked the Hoeryŏng area. 27 The withdrawal of the Japanese from Chosŏn in 1598 coincided with the revolt of the No't'o tribe of the Mt. Paekdu. 28 Furthermore, in the period between 1600 and 1610, rivalry between Nurhaci of the Jianzhou and Bujantai of the Ula deeply involved the Jurchen of the Tumen Valley, with both powers trying to deny the other access to the material and personal resources of this community. According to the Kwambŭk kimun, Bujantai already had a significant foothold north of the Tumen valley in 1591, 29 only shortly after his rise to power among the Ula. In the period 1600–1605, Bujantai attempted to build the strength of the Ula by regular raids against the pŏnhŏs in Hamgyŏng Province, by which he was able to greatly expand his army. 30 Nurhaci and the Jianzhou Jurchen also had extensive involvement in this region during the same period, and there are records of family members of Nit'anggae and branches of the No't'o tribe allying themselves with Nurhaci. 31 Inevitably, rivalry between Bujantai and Nurhaci over Chosŏn's Jurchen subjects developed, coming to a head in 1607 in fighting at Munam, across the river from the Chosŏn garrison of Chongsŏng. This fighting, which occurred partly within Chosŏn territory, brought the Jurchen community of P'is-hot'o (Kor. Kyŏngsŏng) north of Kyŏngsŏng into Nurhaci's control. It also involved further demands by Nurhaci for the "reparation" of the pŏnhŏ, and, indeed, direct action on the part of Nurhaci to remove Chosŏn's pŏnhŏ into his control. Ultimately, most were removed from the region. 32

Despite the considerable unrest among the pŏnhŏ of Hamgyŏng Province during this period, most references to pŏnhŏ in the early seventeenth century

Sŏnjo Sŭjang Sillok 26:25b–27a, Sŏnjo 25 (1592), 07.01 (mun), facsimile 25:623–624, Katō Kiyamasa, during his invasion of the region as part of the Imjin War (1592–1598), allied himself with the malcontented members of both the Korean settler community and the pŏnhŏ, but engaged in ill-conceived and unsuccessful raids against Jurchen across the river. Both rebellious Korean settlers and the Japanese army were driven out by turncoats under the leadership of the Military Aid Chŏng Munbu (1565–1624). The subject of Katō's invasion of Hamgyŏng Province has been extensively discussed. Chŏng T'aseŏp in "Puktam tucht'ıp," where he attempts to understand the initial participation of both Korean settlers and Jurchen in terms of a revolt by two oppressed communities, provides a possible point of entry into this fascinating topic.

Chŏng Munbu, Nong'o jip 1441–47a, esp. 465, HMC 71:114–117, "Ch'anggŭl kŏkkyang bu kyŏngsŏng bu kyŏngsŏng gwan am iyeok kyŏngsŏng." 33 Document dated to 1592.09.20. Him Myŏng'gi, in Jihwa waeran 227, discusses this particular document in relation to the rise of Nurhaci. However, this disorder should not be seen as an unexpected result of the Imjin War, unrest having been endemic to that region since 1583.

Sŏ, 65–133, discusses the No't'o uprisings in some detail.

525. The Kwambŭk kimun was written by Kim Siyang (1581–1643). He was in exile in Hamgyŏng Province from 1611 to 1623. The text here consulted is that found in Kim Nosung, T'awolng p'yersim, vol. 22, 508–565.

Zhun, 149–155.


This battle is discussed in considerable detail by Zhou, 142–144 and Iyam, 50–59. Zhou, especially, provides an excellent discussion of the implications of the battle.
continue to emphasize, like Yi Sugwang, their vital role in defence, gathering information, and even in the economic life of the Six Garrisons region; despite all the difficulties caused by Jurchen subjects during his reign, Sönjo’s court most certainly did not acquiesce willingly to their forcible removal by Nurhaci’s forces. Perhaps the same unrest which made the pönbo at times a source of disorder also made them indispensable as sources for information on the movements of the rising powers in the vicinity.

HAN OF ALL THE JURCHEN

Although Yi Sugwang saw Jurchen as heterogeneous to Chosön he did not consider that the cultural heterogeneity of the Jurchen in anyway disqualified them as subjects of the Chosön monarchy. Yi’s opinions on this were in line with those of Sönjo’s court, but were directly in conflict with the claims made by Nurhaci and Hong Taiji. In fact, until some years after Chosön’s defeat by Manchu forces in 1636–37, the continued presence of Chosön subjects with Jurchen genealogies was a matter of serious diplomatic conflict between Chosön and Manchu.

Already in the late sixteenth century, well before the exclusive adoption of the term “Manchu,” Nurhaci was acquiring the habit of claiming jurisdiction, by virtue of shared ties extending to the Jinn Dynasty (1115–1123), to all Jurchen, regardless of current political affiliation. Thus in 1595 Nurhaci had asked that Chosön “return runaways” with this defining Chosön’s Jurchen subjects as delinquent subjects of the new Jurchen state. Although, as we have seen, Nurhaci pressed his cause militarily, Nurhaci’s court seems to have gone to great lengths to treat their claim to the Jurchen as based on universally accepted authority. Thus a document in the Old Manchu Archive claims that, in 1610, Nurhaci sent word to the Wanli emperor requesting the repatriation of his subjects across the Tumen. Referring to himself as the “Sire Kanglun Han” he addressed a letter to “the Wan Li Han of the Great Chinese State (Amba Nikan Garun).” He informed the Wanli emperor that the Waraka people, who were residing during the time of the Old Aisin Han, entered Korea (Sachon) and had been residing along the borders of Korea. He requested that an investigation be made and that all Waraka be returned. In response we are told that the Wanli emperor gave word to Kwanghawa-gun, the ‘Han of Korea,’ and had him investigate. The Korean Han investigated the Waraka nation and had a thousand households of the Waraka removed and forcibly repatriated.

The above passage suggests a measured and peaceful diplomatic exchange which is not reflected in the Kwanghwa-gun Iiği, Sönjo Sillok, or for that matter, elsewhere in the Old Manchu Archive. Certainly this passage should not be seen as an accurate reflection of early sixteenth century Chosön-Jianzhou politics, although it is often treated as being just that. This passage does inform us, however, that for the new Manchu state it was important to produce the impression that their authority over the Jurchen was so clearly legitimate as to be accepted by both the Ming and Chosön courts.

It is suggested by the immediately preceding sections of both the Old Manchu Archive and the Manzhou Shiito that Nurhaci pressed his genealogical claims through military means, and that these claims were pressed with difficulty against often recalcitrant Waraka communities. Thus, even following Nurhaci’s defeat of Bujiantai in 1607, the Waraka of the Tumen Valley, in particular the communities of Heshe and Fenehe, did not accept Nurhaci’s pretensions in this regard, and were intractable in their refusal to uproot themselves at Nurhaci’s command. In response, Nurhaci argued that they were “one people divided from each other only by the Ulga.” Since he had destroyed the Ulga, he insisted that they submit to him as “the Han of our One Country.” Despite this appeal, he was ultimately forced to have the communities overcome by force, “taking two thousand prisoners.”

The Waraka mentioned here as residing in Fio Hoton, Heshehe and Fenehe, and the Waraka or pönbo described as living on the borders of Chosön, are, of course, substantially the same people, being removed against their will and against the will of the Chosön court into the power of the rising Manchu State. In other documents, moreover, it is quite clear that Nurhaci and Hong Taiji were aware of Chosön resistance to their claims on the pönbo. Attempts by the Chosön court to interfere with Nurhaci’s military activities against Bujiantai and the Jurchen became a regular subject of complaint from both Nurhaci and Hong Taiji. Thus, in a document preserved in the Old Manchu Archive dating to the period immediately before the 1627 Chirungyro invasion, a letter from the “Jacin Prince (beile) and all the princes (beisi) of the Great Manchu Kingdom” complained that, while the Chosön court accused the Manchu of fighting a war for no reason, in fact they had rather extensive reasons for their attack, among them the fact that when Nurhaci’s army was expelling the Waraka, Chosön had sent an army to the borders for no reason and attacked Nurhaci’s army. Na Mangap (1592–1642) tells us in the Pyôngyargok that, during the Pyông invasion (1636–1637), a letter from Hong Taiji denounced the Chosön court once more for the fact that they had attacked them when, “in previous years our army was attacking eastwards against the Uriyangkhad.”

37 For instance, Sönjo Sillok 207:8a–9a, Sönjo 40 (1677), 10.27 (pyôngyn), facsimile 25:370.
38 See 259–191, describes the general dismay of Sönjo’s court at the prospect of the removal of the Jurchens.
39 Sönjo jönge Sillok, 29:3b, 1595(28), 07.01 (ime), facsimile 25:655.
The forced removal of Hamgyǒng Province Jurchen culminating in 1607–1610 must surely have ended the potential use to which the Chosón court could put them, and thus most of the threat to Nurhaci himself. It did not end demands on the part of Nurhaci or Hong Taiji for their return. Not only the memory of Chosón past recalcitrance, but also the presence of transforming Jurchen (hyanghwa hain) in the interior of Chosón continued to be a major source of friction between Chosón and the Manchu courts. As Yi Suyong described above, Jurchen did indeed retreat in unusual numbers from the border regions for the interior of Chosón, as Nurhaci increasingly made their position untenable. The Manchu rulers were by no means pleased when they came to know of their continued presence within Chosón. In 1625, after the failure of Yi Kwai’s uprising (1624), supporters of Yi Kwai took refuge with Hong Taiji, where they reported the presence of “more than a hundred households” of Waraka “who had entered from the north” to settle in a community south of “Han i Necon” or Seoul.1 The Jurchen of the Kyŏnggi region were forcibly repatriated to Mukden during the Pyŏngya Invasion of 1637, but not all Jurchen were successfully removed during this campaign, although the Chosón court certainly tried to argue that this had occurred.2 A repeated demand expressed in documents preserved in the Simyang chang ‘g’ye was that all Jurchen be returned; it was also suggested that it would be quite easy for the Chosón court to do so, as their status as foreigners would almost certainly be recorded in the Household Registry and other documents.3

The constancy of the Goryeo court that there were no more Jurchen to be returned was, as it happens, dishonest from a purely empirical perspective but it may well have been accurate from the point of view of practical administration.4 Inevitably, the actual process of repatriating Jurchen was not easy, not only because the Jurchen themselves were often unwilling to leave, and had, at least in some cases, chosen to enter Chosón at least partly with the purpose of escaping assimilation into the Aisin/Qing banner armies. Some transforming Jurchen seem to have resisted assimilation into Hong Taiji’s armies through flight.5 Others sought to manipulate real ambiguities in their status to avoid both Chosón and Manchu bureaucracies. The case of Kim Kyeduk is particularly striking. According to the Simyang chang ‘g’ye, a group of illegal Chosón ginseng diggers were suspected by the Qing of having earlier fled from the Qing after being captured during the Pyŏngya Invasion. Most of the ginseng diggers were ordered returned to Chosón, and as they were assembling for the trip back to Chosón, a previously repatriated Jurchen from the town of Hamhŭng happened upon them by chance. This repatriated Jurchen, pointing out one man called Kim Kyeduk, declared: “You are also a transforming Jurchen. Why have you only come?” When he was seized and brought to the Yamen, he said: “That man’s father is a Chosón person, and his mother is a Qing person. He has multiple affiliations.” Kim Kyeduk, when questioned, accepted this as being a factual description of his family background.6

The extent of the multiple affiliations continued to cause a problem for the Chosón side of the negotiations, as did the problem of dealing with a population which had good reasons to avoid telling the truth. For the Chosón officials, an additional concern lay in the fact that his wife, Naejong, was a post-station servant and she and her children had hereditary duties in Chosón—they were not like ordinary subjects and so should not be considered subjects for repatriation. From the Qing perspective, however, their two daughters and one son, on account of descent from Kim’s mother, were clearly subjects of the Qing, although they made no very strong claim for his wife.7 However the case was ultimately decided, Kim Kyeduk’s family clearly must have suffered. The Chosón definition of the children’s status considered them to have hereditary duties in the post-station. The Qing definition of their status would have removed the children from their mother. Although ultimately the repatriation process worked against the interests of the subjects, the Chosón officials worried that the subjects, in this case, were manipulating the process. They saw Kim Kyeduk as the ring-leader of the ginseng diggers and believed that he was lying about his background only in order to avoid punishment in Chosón.8 In any case, if Kim was lying, he was taking advantage of the actual ambiguity between Jurchen and Korean in Hamgyŏng Province. When the

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1 Timen Valley. Semyo, Sino-Jured Relations, 32-41, refers to them as the “pseudo-Uliyangga.” See Woodruff for a discussion of the relationship of the Uliyangkhid Jurchen of fifteenth-century Hamgyŏng Province to other Jurchen groups in the same area. Here it likely reflects quite indiscriminately to diverse Jurchen of Hamgyŏng Province.
2 MR, 2:955-958, esp. 257, JMD 1850-1856, esp. 1853.
3 See Kim Changshón for a detailed discussion of the subject.
4 Simyang chang ‘g’ye, 39-40. Entry for 1637 (Chŏngnu’i).09.06.
5 Simyang chang ‘g’ye, 45-46. Entry for 1637 (Chŏngnu’i).08.19.
6 It should be noted that self-described descendants of Jurchen were still present in Hamgyŏng Province in 1758 (Yŏngku Sılok 84:3a-b, Yŏngju 31 (1755).04.24 (Chŏngnu’i), faesimile 43:573), when the Yŏngju court laboured to establish the clear distinction between “transforming foreigners” in which category could be included the descendants of either Japanese or Jurchen, on the one hand, and “descendents of Chinese (inmain chason), on the other.
7 Constant reference is made in the various entries on this subject to the difficulties of forcing young children, the sick, the starving, and the old supporters of the elderly and the young, to make the trip to the Mukden. Thus, in the case of the family of Kim Hahng of Hamhŭng, Choson officials objected to his repatriation on account of the fact that the family had now largely consumed their store of food, and his children were younger than seven; the officials warned that the children would starve if sent to Qing territory. See Simyang chang ‘g’ye, 465-466, entry for 1642 (inmn).06.26. At times it seems that the Choson officials were deliberately trying to reduce the number of people sent to the Qing. An additional aspect, however, is likely to have been the resistance of the people in question to being uprooted from their homes, and the very difficulty for the Choson court of compelling the people in these instances to obey their orders.
8 Reference is made throughout the Simyang chang ‘g’ye to the high rate of flight of all the former inhabitants of Choson, regardless of classification. For one example of the return of Choson’s Jurchen subjects to Choson, see 434-435, entry for 1642 (inmn).04.10. For fleeing subjects. Ming, Choson, Mongol, and Manchu, in the area of Liaodong in the period immediately preceding. See Michael Weiers, “Die unzweckmäßigen Grenzen.”
10 Simyang chang ‘g’ye, 404. Entry for 1642 (inmn).02.22.
Chosŏn officials brought the fact that Kim Kyedŏk was actually a man from Kilchu in Hamgyong Province, and not of transforming foreigner lineage at all, the Qing argued, on the contrary, that although Kim Kyedŏk calls himself a "man of Chosŏn," in that region there were many people with transforming Jurchen affiliation. "How can be be referred to as a Chosŏn subject"?

The Qing court, of course, were concerned to establish a maximalist interpretation of transforming foreigner status, while it was, for the most part, in the interests of the Chosŏn court to reduce the number of people being returned to the Qing, especially, of course, in the case of such people as Naejong and her children who were burdened with hereditary duties under the Chosŏn government. How the culturally diverse people of Hamgyŏng and Kyŏng'gi Provinces responded to these changes is more difficult to determine—one can assume, of course, that, in addition to Chosŏn and Qing negotiations with each other, there would be even more extensive communication between the Chosŏn and Qing officials and the various people caught up in the repatriation network. Such negotiations, inspired by the desire of the people themselves to avoid the break-up of their families, to allow for a somewhat later departure or to provide for ailing and aging relatives or young children, may well have determined aspects of Chosŏn-Qing interaction.

It is, of course, that lineage was only one of the factors used in determining whether or not someone was treated as owing loyalty to the Qing—runaways of Chosŏn origin were also considered Qing subjects, as were Liaodongese of ostensibly Chinese backgrounds. However, it was one key factor, and was understood as such by both the Chosŏn and Qing courts. The assertion of Qing authority over all Jurchen, regardless of their declared loyalties, represented a transformation of the previous trans-Tumen community which had possessed an accepted role in Chosŏn society even while deliberately positioned somewhat outside of the formal span of Chosŏn authority.

**CONCLUSION**

Elliott has pointed out the importance of genealogical and ethnic links to the Manchu of the seventeenth century. He reveals that, while both Nurhaci and Hong Taiji had ambitions that extended beyond the Jurchen, emphasis on shared genealogical ties with the Jurchen was an important technique for expanding their control and asserting their authority, and was central to the creation of the Manchu banners. In this Elliott sees a parallel with the steppe peoples as described by Fletcher, who formed federations united around real or fictitious genealogical links, and who maintained this sense of genealogical connection even in times when the super-tribal federations split up into feuding parties or tribes. Of course, to say that a particular rhetorical strategy was used with considerable success is not to say that it was universally accepted. As we have seen, while genealogy was a key justification for Nurhaci and Hong Taiji's rule over the Jurchen communities of northern Korea, belief in the legitimacy of this claim was by no means necessarily shared by either the Jurchen of the Tumen Valley or by the Chosŏn court—force was the indispensable tool by which the claim of genealogical and cultural unity could be imposed on the Jurchen over the objections of their Korean sponsors.

While among some Ming intellectuals during the same period there was a growth of almost racial hostility to non-Chinese at the Ming frontiers, such attitudes were evidently not shared by the Chosŏn court, who saw their ambiguous Jurchen subjects in the region of the Tumen river as an integral part of the Chosŏn state. Weakened severely by the Imjin War (1592–1598) with Japan, it is likely that Chosŏn was without the economic or military capability to protect their Jurchen subjects. While Chosŏn Korea in the sixteenth century is often described as increasingly sino-centric in its cultural and political orientation, with regards to the pŏnhŏ, such sino-centrism is not readily apparent.

It is true that the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries in Chosŏn Korea were characterized by the growth of a Neo-Confucian tradition which granted exclusive legitimacy to the Ming and denied the cultural value of the Manchu Qing dynasty. Hostility to the Qing at least partly explains Nam Kuman's acceptance, in contrast to Yi Suguwang, of a natural political and cultural boundary between Jurchen and Korean. At the same time, it must be remembered that the creation of the Jurchen-Manchu divide was initiated not by Neo-Confucian Koreans but by a rising Manchu state engaged in behaviour redolent of the cultural traditions of steppe pastoralists.

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53 Notably, of course, Chinese (Nikam), Mongols and Koreans. A good discussion for Nurhaci and Hong Taiji’s relationship with the Chinese of Liaodong is found in Germaine Roth Li, "The Manchu-Chinese Relationship, 1616–1636." "Sources for early relations with Mongols include David M. Farquhar, "The Origins of the Manchu’s Mongolian Policy."

55 For a discussion of the increasing importance of genealogical distinction in the late Ming between Chinese and Jurchen see Pamela Crossley, *Transcultural Mirror*, 57–88.
57 There is an extensive literature on this subject. A recent article in English is JaHyun Kim Haboush, "Contesting Chinese Time."
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